{"id":426,"date":"2019-07-14T08:17:53","date_gmt":"2019-07-14T12:17:53","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/christianciv.com\/blog\/?p=426"},"modified":"2022-09-05T09:07:45","modified_gmt":"2022-09-05T13:07:45","slug":"common-notion-confusion-part-3","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/christianciv.com\/blog\/index.php\/2019\/07\/14\/common-notion-confusion-part-3\/","title":{"rendered":"Idealism in Van Til and Aquinas: Part 3 of a Review of J.V. Fesko\u2019s Reforming Apologetics"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"\"<\/a>J.V. Fesko argues in his book, Reforming Apologetics<\/em>, that Cornelius Van Til rejects natural revelation, and that Van Til rejects the arguments of Aquinas for the existence of God because Aquinas used ideas from Aristotle, which is a use of natural revelation.\u00a0 In the last two posts, I have argued that Van Til rejects neither natural revelation nor Aquinas because of his appeal to natural revelation.\u00a0 Rather, Van Til rejects Christians relying on ideas from non-Christians that are logically inconsistent with Christianity.\u00a0 More specifically, Van Til argues that Aquinas failed to recognize that the oneness of Aristotle\u2019s Unmoved Mover is a different oneness from the Triune God of Christianity.\u00a0 Oneness in terms of the Greek scale of being is different from the oneness in terms of the one, absolute God of Christianity.\u00a0 Part of Fesko\u2019s confusion about the views of Van Til is Fesko\u2019s claim that Van Til adopted ideas of idealist philosophers that are not consistent with biblical teaching.\u00a0 I will address this issue in this last installment of my review of Fesko\u2019s book.<\/p>\n

Fesko objects to Van Til\u2019s appeal to \u201cworldview\u201d because Fesko sees it as adopting Kantian Idealism (100).\u00a0 Relevant to evaluating whether using the word \u201cworldview\u201d means adopting Kantianism is the fact that the idea of \u201cworldview\u201d has been rejected by some Kantians, namely the neo-Kantians of the Marburg school, which had prominence during the end of the 1800s and beginning of the 1900s.\u00a0 They believed that keeping philosophy a rigorous and academic science meant to keep it focused on the epistemology of science rather than promoting values (see, for example, Max Weber\u2019s 1919 address, \u201cScience as a Vocation\u201d).[1]<\/a>\u00a0 Other German Kantians at the time, such as the Southwestern neo-Kantians, defended a focus on Kantian ethics (see, for example, Richard Kroner\u2019s 1914 book, Kant\u2019s Weltanschauung<\/em>).\u00a0 While the Southwestern group was truer to Kant\u2019s full set of writings in my opinion, the point is that equating \u201cworldview\u201d with Kantianism is not a given.\u00a0 Does Fesko disagree with endorsing a philosophy that explains both scientific knowledge and ethics?\u00a0 If not, then Fesko sides with the pro-worldview Kantians.\u00a0 Whether Fesko opposes or embraces the idea of \u201cworldview,\u201d he can find Kantians that support him.<\/p>\n

The more important question is whether Van Til is adopting any anti-Christian Kantian ideas by using the word \u201cworldview.\u201d\u00a0 Fesko only quotes one instance where Van Til uses the word (106 n.53), and he doesn\u2019t examine Van Til\u2019s uses of the word in their contexts to determine what meaning he gives to it, as responsible scholarship demands.\u00a0 Rather, he attributes Idealist views to Van Til based on a use of the word \u201cworldview\u201d that Van Til repudiates.<\/p>\n

What Fesko thinks Van Til means by \u201cthe Christian worldview\u201d is that all knowledge is derived from the Bible.\u00a0 He says, \u201cIt is one thing to claim that the Bible explains God, humans, and the world and as such has implications for every facet of life.\u00a0 It is another to claim that it is exhaustively comprehensive and is the source of all knowledge.\u00a0 Nineteenth-century idealists regularly make the claim that worldviews are systematic explanations of reality\u201d (127).\u00a0 Van Til\u2019s affirmation of \u201cworldview\u201d is in agreement with Fesko\u2019s affirmation of the first statement.\u00a0 (Although, I\u2019ll explain below, there are weaknesses in Fesko\u2019s affirmation of \u201cworldview\u201d even in this limited sense).\u00a0 Maybe Fesko is confusing Van Til with Gordan Clark who did teach that all knowledge comes from the Bible (qualifying that with Platonic distinction between \u201cknowledge\u201d and \u201copinion,\u201d so that \u201cknowledge\u201d is only that which is certain and only comes from the Bible, in contrast to beliefs derived from experience, which are uncertain and therefore \u201copinion.\u201d)<\/p>\n

Van Til very clearly does not<\/em> believe that the Bible is the only source of knowledge.\u00a0 Fesko\u2019s claim is refuted by the evidence that I provided in the first post, that Van Til believes in natural revelation. \u00a0Furthermore, as Fesko correctly observes, Van Til did not reject appeals to empirical evidence (140-41).\u00a0\u00a0 Fesko complains that some followers of Van Til have rejected the use of empirical evidence, leading him to conclude that \u201csome formulations of the TAG, therefore, are obstacles to recovery of the use of the book of nature in apologetics\u201d (141).[2]<\/a>\u00a0 Ok, then if some are, then some formulations aren\u2019t; and one of those formulations that isn\u2019t is Van Til\u2019s.[3]<\/a>\u00a0 Or the situation might be stated in this way:\u00a0 TAG itself is not the issue but rather erroneous implications drawn from TAG \u2013 that it is the sole, sufficient argument needed in apologetics rather than necessary for a limited purpose in apologetics.\u00a0 Van Til describes the apologetic task using the analogy of modern warfare, in which \u201cdifferent kinds of fighting are mutually dependent upon one another.\u201d [4]<\/a>\u00a0 The vindication of Christianity requires shooting \u201cthe big guns under the protection of which the definite advances in the historical field must be made.\u201d[5]<\/a>\u00a0 The big guns are the sweeping philosophical arguments (i.e. TAG), while historical evidence is compared to the small arms fire.\u00a0 \u00a0Some followers of Van Til may claim that the big guns are all that is necessary to win the apologetic war against the attacks of anti-Christian arguments, but Van Til disagrees. \u00a0It is true, however, that Van Til believes that TAG is the only sound argument for the existence of God.\u00a0 To the extent that aspects of any other arguments have validity, they should be presented as the transcendental argument that God is necessary for the possibility of predication, whether that predication is about morality or objects of experience.[6]<\/a>\u00a0 But there is more to apologetics than proving the existence of God.\u00a0 Van Til says that such things as proving that a claim to revelation belongs in the canon of Scripture and that Christ rose from the dead require the support of empirical evidence.[7]<\/a><\/p>\n

Involved in Fesko\u2019s claim that the Bible is the source of all knowledge is the claim that Van Til adopted the Idealist view that all knowledge is deduced from a master concept, and Van Til made the Bible that master concept (127-32).\u00a0 Back in 1955 in his book The Defense of the Faith,<\/em> Van Til answered this charge \u201cthat I think of the Bible as presenting us with a deductive system.\u201d[8]<\/a>\u00a0 In denial of the charge, he writes, \u201cMan cannot know anything, let alone deduce anything, about the nature of God except God reveals something of himself by voluntary revelation.\u201d[9]<\/a>\u00a0 He shows that he has taken positions contrary to the charge against him in his writings prior to this time, such as:\u00a0 \u201cIn The New Modernism<\/em> I had defended the idea that though Christianity is surely not a deductive system, or an aspect of the coherence of Reality of which idealists speak, yet it is directly identifiable and intelligently defensible.\u201d[10]<\/a>\u00a0 Van Til often<\/em> contends against the idea of the Bible as a deductive system leading to exhaustive knowledge because that would mean that man could potentially become all-knowing, if he just had the time to make all the deductive connections:<\/p>\n

The biblical \u201csystem of truth\u201d is not a \u201cdeductive system.\u201d The various teachings of Scripture are not related to one another in the way that syllogisms of a series are related. The \u201csystem of truth\u201d of Scripture presupposes the existence of the internally, eternally, self-coherent, triune God who reveals Himself to man with unqualified authority.[11]<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

If God is really man\u2019s creator then man\u2019s thinking must be thought of as being analogical. Therefore his concepts cannot rightly be employed as the instruments of a\u00a0deductive system.[12]<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Moreover, when we say that man understands the revelation of God what is meant is not that he sees through this revelation exhaustively. Neither by logical reasoning nor by intuition can man do more than take to himself the revelation of God on the authority of God. . . .\u00a0 Man\u2019s system of truth, even when formulated in direct and self-conscious subordination to the revelation of the system of truth contained in Scripture, is therefore not a\u00a0deductive system.[13]<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

. . . the Reformed system of doctrine is composed of elements that are exegetically taken from Scripture. The Reformed system is not a\u00a0deduction from a master concept.[14]<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Fesko could have easily searched for \u201cdeductive system\u201d in the Logos<\/em> digital versions of Van Til\u2019s works and found these quotes, but his research was not thorough enough to carry out this simple task.<\/p>\n

Fesko thinks that it is absurd to think that the Bible instructs us \u201cwhether to conduct brain surgery or administer medication to heal a patient\u201d (131), and Van Til agrees.\u00a0 Here is one of Van Til\u2019s more well-known statements (among his admirers at least) about the relationship between the Bible and empirical investigation:<\/p>\n

The Bible is thought of as authoritative on everything of which it speaks. Moreover, it speaks of everything. We do not mean that it speaks of football games, of atoms, etc., directly, but we do mean that it speaks of everything either directly or by implication. It tells us not only of the Christ and his work, but it also tells us who God is and where the universe about us has come from. It tells us about theism as well as about Christianity. It gives us a philosophy of history as well as history. Moreover, the information on these subjects is woven into an inextricable whole. It is only if you reject the Bible as the word of God that you can separate the so-called religious and moral instruction of the Bible from what it says, e.g., about the physical universe.<\/p>\n

This view of Scripture, therefore, involves the idea that there is nothing in this universe on which human beings can have full and true information unless they take the Bible into account. We do not mean, of course, that one must go to the Bible rather than to the laboratory if one wishes to study the anatomy of the snake. But if one goes only to the laboratory and not also to the Bible one will not have a full or even true interpretation of the snake.”[15]<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Because he does not believe that the Bible is the basis for an exhaustive system of deductive knowledge, Van Til boldly affirms that there can be apparently contradictory statements in Scripture:\u00a0 \u201c. . . while we shun as poison the idea of the really contradictory we embrace with passion the idea of the apparently<\/em> contradictory. . . .\u00a0 All our ingenuity cannot exhaust the humanly inexhaustible rationality of God.\u201d[16]<\/a>\u00a0 There may never be a resolution for these apparent contradictions for human minds, for all of human history or even for eternity for glorified saints.\u00a0 These apparent contradictions are not real contradictions because God is the source of Scripture, and He is absolutely rational.\u00a0 God must voluntarily reveal additional information to humans in order for the apparent contradictions to be resolved.<\/p>\n

To refute this claim that Van Til thinks that the Bible is the source of all knowledge, we can also look at Van Til\u2019s proof of the existence of God.\u00a0 Fesko himself says that \u201cVan Til\u2019s argument is a subjective version of Aquinas\u2019s second and fifth arguments for the existence of God\u201d (142).\u00a0 Aquinas\u2019s second proof is for God as the ultimate efficient cause, and the fifth proof is for God as the final cause of all things.\u00a0 I agree with Fesko on that point.\u00a0 As for the claim that Van Til offers a \u201csubjective version,\u201d Fesko offers no argument, and in fact, Van Til argues that God must exist as the source of all knowledge in order for humans to have objective knowledge, that is, knowledge of external objects.\u00a0 But my main point here is that, having affirmed that Van Til\u2019s argument involves reasoning about efficient and final causality and so does Aquinas\u2019s in two of his arguments, Fesko also says that Aquinas\u2019s proofs are examples of arguments from natural revelation (Chapter 4).\u00a0 If A=B and B=C, then A=C.\u00a0 Van Til\u2019s transcendental argument for the existence of God (\u201cTAG\u201d) is an argument from natural revelation.\u00a0 I have made that same point before.[17]<\/a><\/p>\n

Does this mean that Van Til\u2019s argument is \u201cThomistic\u201d?\u00a0 John Frame has made this kind of claim.[18]<\/a>\u00a0 He says that Bahnsen\u2019s argument in his debate with Gordan Stein was Thomistic because he appealed to causation to make his argument for God\u2019s existence.\u00a0 Similarly, Fesko says that, because \u201cCalvin invokes the argument from design\u201d (62) by noting that the beauty of the universe should lead us to think of God\u2019s wisdom, and teaches \u201ca cause-and-effect relationship between God and the creation\u201d (63), Calvin has \u201csubstantive agreement with the two Thomistic proofs, the cosmological and teleological arguments\u201d (63).\u00a0 Why should Aquinas\u2019s name be attached to all argument for God\u2019s existence that appeal to causation or design when some of those arguments have major differences with Aquinas\u2019s and when appeals to causation and design were made before Aquinas came along?\u00a0 Van Til has major disagreements with Aquinas about how to construct an argument for God\u2019s existence, therefore calling his argument Thomistic because of the similarity of appealing to causation and design is unhelpful and superficial.\u00a0 \u00a0If you have two sets of beliefs, let\u2019s say Set A (for Aquinas) and Set V (for Van Til), and there are major issues where the two sets do not overlap, then Set V should not be classified as a subset of Set A, even if there are some areas of overlap.\u00a0 Technically, a subset must have every element of another set, but I would be willing to call Van Til\u2019s TAG \u201cThomistic\u201d if the differences were minor, but they are not.\u00a0 Calvin\u2019s statements don\u2019t contain much argument, just the moral appeal that men should turn their minds to the wisdom of God when they see the design and order of nature.\u00a0 That is no basis for claiming that Calvin accepted Aquinas\u2019s arguments in their full context, which incorporates Aristotelian philosophy.\u00a0\u00a0 Van Til argues that Calvin\u2019s approach to knowledge undermines the Scholastic view of knowledge, so Calvin\u2019s views are not a subset of Aquinas\u2019s if this related issue is taken into account.\u00a0 Fesko appeals to Calvin\u2019s remarks about connecting the beauty and order of creation to the wisdom of the Creator in order to rebut Van Til\u2019s claim that Calvin rejected the Scholastic view of knowledge.\u00a0 He should have stuck to directly addressing Van Til\u2019s argument regarding Calvin and Scholasticism.<\/p>\n

The argument that Van Til makes for Calvin rejecting Scholasticism is that in the first paragraph of his Institutes of the Christian Religion,<\/em> he appeals to beginning with the positive revelation of Scripture as necessary to have true knowledge of man is as well as God. [19]<\/a> \u00a0This contrasts with Aquinas\u2019s empiricist approach that leads to saying, at the beginning of Summa Theologica<\/em>, \u201cWe cannot know what God is, but only what He is not.\u201d \u00a0While Calvin does not explicitly repudiate Aquinas\u2019s method of remotion and other Aristotelean ideas about form and matter, he never appeals to knowing God by beginning with experience and then negating the positive aspects of the empirical world until we reach an empty universal that we call God.[20]<\/a>\u00a0 Van Til also appeals to Calvin\u2019s statements that men fail to acknowledge God because they are willfully blind.[21]<\/a>\u00a0\u00a0 In contrast, Aquinas says that through nature we know God in a \u201cgeneral and confused way\u201d[22]<\/a> because this knowledge is gained through effects that are not proportionate to the cause.[23]<\/a>\u00a0 In other words, the nature of the evidence obscures the knowledge of God rather than man\u2019s rebellion against clear, inescapable evidence.\u00a0 Fesko cites Calvin\u2019s Institutes<\/em> at 1.5.11 to argue that \u201cIn fact, with Aquinas, Calvin believed that only the philosophically learned could access this natural knowledge of God; this is something that the common rabble could not do\u201d (64).\u00a0 Actually, Calvin\u2019s statement in this paragraph is in keeping with Van Til\u2019s anti-Thomistic characterization of Calvin\u2019s views.\u00a0 Calvin says here, \u201cBright, however, as is the manifestation which God gives both of himself and his immortal kingdom in the mirror of his works, so great is our stupidity, so dull are we in regard to these bright manifestations, that we derive no benefit from them.\u201d\u00a0 The problem, again, is not the obscurity of the revelation but the depravity of man.\u00a0 Calvin\u2019s point in regard to philosophers in this passage is that they, as the most acute inquirers into the nature of reality, should see God\u2019s glory manifest in nature better than most, but they don\u2019t.\u00a0 Despite the clarity of natural revelation, even the most distinguished philosophers \u201clabour under such hallucinations\u201d and are prone to \u201cvanity and error.\u201d<\/p>\n

Fesko observes that Van Til realizes that Calvin was not completely consistent in rejecting Scholastic categories (66-67). On occasion, Calvin falls into making a sharp distinction between earthly and heavenly knowledge, and saying that with respect to the heavenly knowledge, the natural man is blinder than a mole.[24]<\/a>\u00a0 Van Til admits that Calvin \u201cdid not bring out with sufficient clearness at all times that the natural man is as blind as a mole with respect to natural things as well as with respect to spiritual things.\u201c[25]<\/a>\u00a0 Van Til points out that, nevertheless, Calvin lessens the contrast by saying that the unbeliever\u2019s knowledge of earthly things is vanity and that the unbeliever sometimes states true things regarding heavenly matters.[26]<\/a>\u00a0 Fesko responds by saying that \u201cThe problem of Van Til\u2019s analysis is that it contradicts Calvin\u2019s clear statements on the matter.\u00a0 Calvin unmistakably states that the unbelievers are blind with regard to heavenly knowledge but not blind to earthly knowledge\u201d (66-67).\u00a0 But Calvin does not say that unbelievers are \u201cnot blind to earthly knowledge.\u201d\u00a0 He does say that their earthly knowledge is vanity and that, concerning the reasoning of unbelievers: \u201cbeing partly weakened and partly corrupted, a shapeless ruin is all that remains.\u201d[27]<\/a>\u00a0 Calvin\u2019s position is that fallen reason is not \u201cutterly fruitless,\u201d[28]<\/a> but it is corrupted.<\/p>\n

Likewise, when Van Til says that \u201cthe natural man is as blind as a mole with respect to natural things,\u201d he is not denying all knowledge to unbelievers but is saying that the unregenerate have a vision that is \u201cblurred.\u201d[29]<\/a> \u00a0And he further says that the unregenerate have a less distorted view of earthly things than heavenly things:\u00a0 \u201c. . . that from an ultimate point of view, the natural man knows nothing truly, but that from a relative point of view he knows something about all things.\u00a0 He knows all things after a fashion<\/em>, and his fashion is best when he deals with earthly things such as electricity, etc.\u201d[30]<\/a>\u00a0 The natural man knows nothing truly in the sense that they try to place their knowledge in the false context of a world without God, but, because they actually live in God\u2019s world, they can\u2019t be entirely consistent with their God-denying worldview.\u00a0 \u201cMen can read nature aright only when it is studied as the home of a man who is made in the image of God.\u201d[31]<\/a>\u00a0 The problem with a sharp distinction between earthly and heavenly knowledge is that atheism has a distorting effect on how atheists understand earthly matters.\u00a0 Since God\u2019s existence is revealed through creation, and since man is in rebellion against God, then unbelievers are compelled to distort earthly things in order to deny heavenly things.\u00a0 The more that atheists try to be consistent with their denial of God (the more that they are \u201cepistemologically self-conscious\u201d), the more that they are going to distort earthly knowledge.\u00a0 Van Til also points out that atheist scientists do no limit their talk to earthly things; they draw all sorts of implications from their scientific studies about reality as a whole.\u00a0 And the Bible does not limit itself to heavenly matters, but speaks of the origin and destiny of the earthly world.[32]<\/a><\/p>\n

I still need to answer this question:\u00a0 What does Van Til mean by \u201cworldview\u201d?\u00a0 Here is the definition that he gives:\u00a0 \u201cPhilosophy, as usually defined, deals with a theory of reality, with a theory of knowledge, and with a theory of ethics. That is to say philosophies usually undertake to present a life and world view.\u201d[33]<\/a>\u00a0 Covering these three areas gives a comprehensive interpretation of reality:\u00a0 \u201cThe Christian life and world view, it was argued, presents itself as an absolutely comprehensive interpretation of human experience.\u201d[34]<\/a>\u00a0 Note that the Bible is comprehensive in terms of covering the three major branches of philosophy, not in the sense of providing comprehensive knowledge of the world.\u00a0 Greg Bahnsen, by the way, uses the same definition of worldview as Van Til:\u00a0 \u201cThe Christian worldview, as Van Til never tired of emphasizing, must be defended as a unity (comprising metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics in an unbreakable system) over against the sinful worldviews of the natural man.\u201d[35]<\/a>\u00a0 Is it distinctly Kantian to have an integrated system of metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics?\u00a0 No.\u00a0 Does having an integrated system of metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics entail anti-Christian ideas?\u00a0 No.\u00a0 Does Fesko object to a philosophy that has an integrated view of metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics?<\/p>\n

Fesko may not object, yet Thomistic philosophy undermines this definition of worldview.\u00a0 Van Til objects that Aquinas tries to integrate an anti-Christian view of all three areas of philosophy into Christianity, making Thomism inadequately integrated.\u00a0 The Thomistic procedure can be described as attempting to use an anti-Christian epistemology to prove Christian metaphysics \u2013 namely, the Christian God.\u00a0 (Things aren\u2019t exactly this neat.\u00a0 No philosopher has developed an epistemology without having some concept of metaphysics in view.\u00a0 What we claim exists and how we claim to know what exists are inextricably related issues.)\u00a0 As I have explained, Van Til argues that the Aristotelian epistemology can only lead to an anti-Christian view of metaphysics, not the God of the Bible.\u00a0 If \u201cworldview\u201d seems like an alien concept to Thomists, it is because their philosophy is not integrated.\u00a0 Their distinction between reason and faith, with the first derived from Aristotle and the second derived from the Bible, undermines viewing Christianity as a worldview, having an integrated<\/em> view of metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics.\u00a0 Van Til says, \u201cBoth men [Warfield and Bavinck] view the place of Scripture as imbedded in their total outlook on life. They do not build the first story of their house by reason in order then to add a second story built by faith. Their outlook on life is a living whole. For convenience we speak of this total outlook on reality as a world and life view.”[36]<\/a>\u00a0 Van Til depicts Thomists as having a two-story house with the first story built from Aristotle\u2019s philosophy, which is then used to reach the second story that is built from the Bible.[37]<\/a>\u00a0 But the first story is inconsistent with the second story, like a building that provides no way to reach the second floor from the first floor.\u00a0 In fact, the first floor is a collapsing floor because it undermines the possibility of reason, knowledge, and ethics.<\/p>\n

Given these ideas that undermine seeing Christianity as a worldview, it is not surprising the Fesko defends the Lutheran dichotomy between the secular and sacred:\u00a0 \u201cIn classic Lutheran theology, for example, Martin Luther characterizes the two kingdoms (sacred and secular) as the kingdoms of the right and left hands.\u00a0 But whose hands, precisely, are in view?\u00a0 God\u2019s hands are in view.\u00a0 God sovereignly reigns over both realms but in different ways\u201d (186-87).\u00a0 \u00a0Despite many harsh criticisms by Luther against Aristotle, Luther adopts the Aristotelian view that reason is the ultimate guide for the polis<\/em>, even over-ruling God\u2019s law.\u00a0 He says that the prince should \u201cuse his own reason to judge when and where the law should be applied in its full rigour, and when it should be moderated. So that reason remains the ruler at all times, the supreme law and master of all the laws.\u201d[38]<\/a>\u00a0 Luther appeals to the wisdom of Solomon to prove that reason rules even over the law of Moses:\u00a0 \u201cAnd because Solomon knew it, he despaired of all the laws, even though God had laid them down for him through Moses, and of all his princes and counsellors [sic], and turned to God himself, asking him for a wise heart to rule the people.\u201d[39]<\/a>\u00a0\u00a0 Luther says, \u201cIn short, I know nothing about what laws to recommend to a prince; I want only to instruct him how to dispose his heart with regard to whatever laws, counsels, verdicts and cases he has to deal with.\u201d[40]<\/a>\u00a0 Luther\u2019s approach claims that God rules over the State, all the while repudiating God\u2019s law as a standard for the state.\u00a0 Paul says that, \u201cthe mind that is set on the flesh is hostile to God, for it does not submit to God’s law; indeed, it cannot\u201d (Rom. 8:7), yet Luther and other Two Kingdom advocates would have these depraved pagans decide right and wrong without correction from God\u2019s revealed law.\u00a0 Luther\u2019s followers were quite consistent with Luther\u2019s theology to not protest against Hitler until his Nazi regime began interfering in the church.\u00a0 At that point, godless totalitarianism had gained a death-grip on the nation and resistance was futile.\u00a0\u00a0 Kenneth Barnes remarks that even of those Christians who openly opposed Hitler, \u201cmost of the rebel Confessing Christians opposed totalitarianism only when total control extended to the church.\u201d[41]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0 Dietrich Bonhoeffer was an inspiring Christian martyr, but his Lutheran theology led him and others to oppose the direction of the state only when it was far too late.\u00a0 This consistency between Thomism in apologetics and Lutheranism in political ethics is that godless principles for earthly matters are accepted in God\u2019s name.<\/p>\n

Fesko defends his view from the Westminster Confession of Faith: \u00a0\u201cGod is the supreme King of all the world and has ordained civil magistrates to be under him (23:1), whereas the visible church is the kingdom of the Lord Jesus Christ\u201d (187 n.119).\u00a0 Regardless of whether Fesko is right that the Confession is supporting the Lutheran view of civil government,[42]<\/a> this is a false dichotomy in terms of the biblical text.\u00a0\u00a0 God\u2019s prophets declared that the Messiah would reign over the kings of the world (Psalm 2, 72; Isa. 9, 42; Dan. 2, 7).\u00a0 As described in Daniel 7:<\/p>\n

I saw in the night visions, and behold, with the clouds of heaven there came one like a son of man, and he came to the Ancient of Days and was presented before him.\u00a0 And to him was given dominion and glory and a kingdom, that all peoples, nations, and languages should serve him; his dominion is an everlasting dominion, which shall not pass away, and his kingdom one that shall not be destroyed.\u00a0\u00a0 (Daniel 7:13-14)<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

The New Testament affirms that this came to realization with the resurrection and ascension of Christ.\u00a0 As Jesus declares in the Great Commission, \u201cAll authority in heaven and on earth has been given to me\u201d (Matt. 28:18).\u00a0 And Paul declares, \u201c. . . he worked in Christ when he raised him from the dead and seated him at his right hand in the heavenly places, far above all rule and authority and power and dominion, and above every name that is named, not only in this age but also in the one to come\u201d (Eph. 1:20-21; also, Phil. 2:8-11; 1 Peter 3:21-22).\u00a0 Jesus is the \u201cKing of kings, and Lord of lords\u201d (1 Tim. 6:15), and He is \u201cthe ruler of kings on earth\u201d (Rev. 1:5).\u00a0 The New Testament declares Psalm 2 began to be fulfilled at Christ\u2019s resurrection:\u00a0 \u201cAnd we bring you the good news that what God promised to the fathers, this he has fulfilled to us their children by raising Jesus, as also it is written in the second Psalm, \u201cYou are my Son, today I have begotten you\u201d\u00a0 (Acts 13:32-33).<\/p>\n

Contrary to Fesko (113), advocates of Theonomy have not denied the existence of natural revelation.\u00a0 Greg Bahnsen writes, \u201cThe Biblical perspective is that the law revealed to the Jews in spoken form has been revealed in unspoken form to the Gentiles, and the two moral codes are co-extensive.\u00a0 Paul did not somehow restrict natural revelation to the Decalogue (see, for example, Rom.1:32). . . .\u201d[43]<\/a>\u00a0 The problem is, once again, Fesko the Calvinist seminary professor has compromised the doctrine of total depravity.\u00a0 God\u2019s law is revealed to all men through creation, but men suppress the truth in unrighteousness, making redemptive revelation necessary that states God\u2019s law more clearly.\u00a0 Van Til points out[44]<\/a> that even before the Fall, God thought it necessary to provide special revelation regarding Adam\u2019s ethical obligations:\u00a0 be fruitful and multiply, rule the creation, eat of any tree in the garden, except for one.\u00a0 Since God rules over all of life, rebellion against God manifests itself in all areas of life, therefore redemptive revelation is necessary to redeem all areas of life, even areas like mathematics and science (pace<\/em> Fesko, 113).\u00a0 As Van Til puts it, \u201cthis redemptive revelation of God had to be as comprehensive<\/em> as the sweep of sin.\u201d[45]<\/a> \u00a0In the classic 1951 book, Christ and Culture<\/em>, H. Richard Niebuhr describes Calvinism as transformative of culture and Lutheranism as a paradoxical two-kingdom approach to culture that ends up being antinomian.\u00a0 Fesko rejects Calvinism\u2019s more consistent advocacy of God\u2019s sovereignty and human depravity in favor of Luther\u2019s comprises with pagan government.<\/p>\n

Another of Fesko\u2019s claims about Van Til related to Idealist philosophy is that Van Til advocates a coherence theory of truth rather than a correspondence theory of truth.\u00a0 Fesko recognizes that the Christian view is committed to a type of coherence theory of truth because all facts originate from God, who has complete knowledge of all things.\u00a0 \u201cGiven that God created all things, to understand reality through truth-claims means aligning one\u2019s mind with God\u2019s mind\u201d (154). \u00a0Contrary to empiricists who seek correspondence between facts and the human mind apart from God, and contrary to rationalists who seek coherence in the mind of man, Van Til argues that the coherence of all truth in the mind of God is the basis for correspondence between the mind of man and the facts of the external world \u2013 God is the origin of both and has created them to fit together.[46]<\/a> \u00a0Fesko\u2019s criticism amounts to accusations that Van Til\u2019s approach tends to discourage the use of empirical evidence and discourage appeals to design and causation to prove God\u2019s existence, which is a false claim by some of Van Til\u2019s critics and some misguided followers.\u00a0 Fesko quotes Frame\u2019s charge that Van Til believes that \u201canyone who uses an argument from design or causality is presupposing a nontheistic epistemology\u201d (153).[47]<\/a>\u00a0 Van Til is very clear that design, causation, necessary being, and morality could all be used to prove God\u2019s existence as long as they were part of a transcendental argument:\u00a0 \u201c. . . all the theistic arguments should really be taken together and reduced to the one argument of the possibility of human predication. . . . [Men] ought to reason analogically about their being (ontological argument), about the cause of their being (cosmological arguments), and about the purpose of their being (teleological argument).\u201d[48]<\/a><\/p>\n

Fesko says that \u201cVan Til and Aquinas employed a similar apologetic methodology\u201d (148) in that Aquinas borrowed some ideas from Aristotle that were consistent with Christianity in order to defend the Christian faith, and Van Til borrowed some ideas from Kant that were consistent with Christianity in order to defend the Christian faith.\u00a0 Fesko complains, however, \u201cBut for some reason, Van Til took a weed whacker to Aquinas\u2019s Aristotelian garden and nurtured his Kantian one\u201d (149).\u00a0 There is some truth to Van Til borrowing from Kant, but the situation is not parallel to Aquinas borrowing from Aristotle.\u00a0 Fesko recognizes that Van Til \u201coffered trenchant criticism\u201d of Idealism (141).\u00a0 He tries to make this similar to Aquinas\u2019s use of Aristotle by saying that Aquinas was not \u201can unreconstructed Aristotelian\u201d (153).\u00a0 But the two approaches are not parallel.\u00a0 Van Til denied that Kant\u2019s philosophy supports belief in the true God; Aquinas thought that Aristotle\u2019s philosophy proves the true God.\u00a0 Van Til, in fact, regards Kant\u2019s philosophy as one of the most anti-theistic philosophies in the history of philosophy.\u00a0 It asserts human autonomy rather than God\u2019s sovereignty.\u00a0 Van Til\u2019s denunciations of Kant have no parallel in Aquinas\u2019s writings, which esteem Aristotle as \u201cthe Philosopher.\u201d\u00a0 Van Til borrows from Kant how to frame the problems of philosophy, as a problem of bringing the One and the Many together in order to account for the preconditions of intelligible experience.\u00a0 But while the type of argument that Van Til uses is borrowed from Kant, the substance of Van Til\u2019s argument is the exact opposite.\u00a0 In contrast, Aquinas follows much of the substance of Aristotle\u2019s philosophy.\u00a0 Here are some examples of Van Til denouncing Kant\u2019s philosophy:<\/p>\n

Traditional Protestantism has at the center of its thought the notion of the self-sufficient triune God of Scripture as the ultimate point of reference for all human predication. \u00a0Nothing could be more diametrically opposed to the basic contention of all of Kant\u2019s thinking. \u00a0According to Kant it is man as autonomous who, in effect, takes the place of the God of Luther and Calvin.[49]<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

In the ultimate sense he did this, as noted, by carrying forth the apostate idea of autonomy of man to far greater consistency than had been done before. For Kant\u00a0God is not the creator of man. God is not the law-giver to man. God cannot reveal himself to man through nature or through man\u2019s own constitution as the image-bearer of God. Man can know nothing of God.\u00a0 . . .\u00a0 To have any relation to God or to nature, man must project them both. And Kant does project both nature and God.[50]<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

In fact, Van Til sees Kant\u2019s philosophy as a development from similar principles taught by Aristotle.\u00a0 Kant developed those principles toward greater consistency with the idea of human autonomy.\u00a0 The Greek form-matter scheme was a precursor to Kant\u2019s freedom-nature scheme of reality:<\/p>\n

But the freedom-nature scheme itself may be included in the form-matter scheme as a general expression of all apostate thought. The modern freedom-nature scheme sprang in its large outlines from\u00a0Kant\u2019s philosophy as\u00a0the Greek form-matter scheme came to its climactic expression in Aristotle. But both in Aristotle and in Kant it is would-be autonomous man who is the ultimate source of predication. In both Aristotle and Kant too this would-be autonomous man employs a purely irrational scheme of individuation and a purely abstract impersonal principle of unity.[51]<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

In other words, the problem with both Aristotle\u2019s philosophy and Kant\u2019s is that they assume an original separation of the One and the Many.\u00a0 Both the One and the Many are necessary for knowledge, and in both philosophies, abstract unity and abstract plurality must be brought together to form knowledge.\u00a0 In both philosophies, the human mind is the only active mind that does that; although, Kant\u2019s philosophy asserts human autonomy in that process of knowledge formation more consistently than Aristotle\u2019s metaphysical realism. \u00a0Kant takes human autonomy to its climax by asserting that there is no intelligible being outside the human mind.\u00a0 Given my argument in the previous post, that Aristotle\u2019s Unmoved Mover is an empty abstract concept, it is not far from Aristotle\u2019s philosophy to Kant\u2019s claim that the concept of God is merely a limiting concept, a projection of an ideal from the human mind rather than a being that exists outside the human mind.[52]<\/a>\u00a0 In contrast to Aristotle and Kant, in Van Til\u2019s view, the One and the Many are eternally related in the mind of God, so human knowledge is a matter of being receptively reconstructive of God\u2019s original knowledge.[53]<\/a><\/p>\n

Fesko claims that Van Til\u2019s Kantian leanings do not allow him to deal with the challenge of postmodernism.\u00a0 This is the reverse of the matter.\u00a0 The change from modernism to postmodernism is a recapitulation of an earlier period of intellectual history that gave rise to Kantianism.\u00a0 In the 1700s, David Hume tried to account for knowledge on a purely empirical basis, but he discovered that he could not account for any order to nature, only sense impressions that change by the moment.\u00a0 Kant was awakened from his \u201cdogmatic slumbers\u201d by Hume\u2019s failure to account for scientific knowledge through empiricism and attempted to save science by proposing that the order that we find in nature is actually the product of categories of the autonomous human mind that are imposed on sense experience.\u00a0 Then in the twentieth century, the logical positivists, or more broadly, the modernists, tried again to account for knowledge and science in terms of pure sense experience.\u00a0 Like Hume, they failed, which begat postmodernism with its Kantian-type of claim that all facts are interpreted facts.\u00a0 As W.V.O. Quine puts it, all beliefs, scientific or otherwise, are \u201cunderdetermined by experience.\u201d[54]<\/sup><\/a> \u00a0\u00a0Van Til agrees with the claim of postmodernism that all facts are interpreted facts.\u00a0 He says that \u201cdescription is patternization. It is an act of definition. It is a statement of the what as well as of the that. It is a statement of connotation as well as of denotation. Description itself is explanation.\u201d [55]<\/a>\u00a0 \u00a0Van Til avoids the relativism of postmodernism because, in accord with the Bible, he attributes to God an absolutely true interpretation of reality, so our finite human interpretations of reality must reflect God\u2019s interpretation in order to be true.\u00a0 If humans cannot get outside of language, and if human autonomy is true, then the world outside the human mind is unintelligible.\u00a0 Every individual lives in his own world with his own self-created \u201ctruth.\u201d\u00a0 That is the terminus of postmodernism.\u00a0 On the other hand, if humans cannot get outside of language, and an absolutely rational, linguistic God is the Creator of the universe, then the categories of the human mind can reflect the operation of the world outside the human mind.\u00a0 The Thomist position is closer to the modernist position in its insistence that all knowledge begins with sensation (\u201cNothing is in the intellect that was not previously in sense.\u201d De Veritate<\/em>, Article III), and thus the Thomist is the one who has less common ground to relate to postmodernism than the Van Tillian.\u00a0 That doesn\u2019t make Van Til\u2019s position right, but it refutes Fesko\u2019s claim against Van Til\u2019s position.<\/p>\n

In conclusion, Fesko and the other Reformed Thomists who endorse his book need to start over from scratch.\u00a0 They don\u2019t understand Van Til\u2019s criticisms of Aquinas.\u00a0 If Van Til misunderstands Aquinas, they haven\u2019t proven it.\u00a0 Or better, they should realize that they didn\u2019t understand Van Til; and he actually makes a lot of sense.\u00a0 \u00a0They should realize that Van Til\u2019s apologetic methodology provides the best answers to the philosophical and evidential claims against Christianity and it best defends the Reformed doctrines of God\u2019s sovereignty, man\u2019s total depravity, and the supremacy of Scripture.<\/p>\n

_____________________________________________________________<\/p>\n

[1]<\/a>\u00a0 Peter E. Gordon, Continental Divide:\u00a0 Heidegger, Cassirer, Davos<\/em> (Cambridge, MA:\u00a0 Harvard University Press, 2010), pp. 58-59.<\/p>\n

[2]<\/a>\u00a0 I have criticized some statements by Greg Bahnsen with respect to the use of empirical evidence in my essay, \u201cThe Scope and Limits of Van Til\u2019s Transcendental Argument,\u201d pp. 54-56, http:\/\/www.christianciv.com\/The_Scope_and_Limits_of_VTAG.pdf<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[3]<\/a>\u00a0 Fesko quotes a passage from Van Til that seems opposed to the use of empirical evidence (140), but Fesko seems to have failed to read from the beginning of the chapter up to this passage, because if he did, he would have realized that Van Til is summarizing G.C. Berkouwer\u2019s views, which are close to\u00a0 Van Til\u2019s but not identical.\u00a0 Fesko needs a better example than this to prove that Van Til was inconsistent on the legitimacy of empirical evidence in apologetics.<\/p>\n

[4]<\/a>\u00a0 Van Til, Christian Apologetics<\/em>, p. 1.<\/p>\n

[5]<\/a>\u00a0 Ibid., p. 2.<\/p>\n

[6]<\/a>\u00a0 Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology<\/em>, pp. 88, 102-03; A Survey of Christian Epistemology<\/em>, pp. 10-11.<\/p>\n

[7]<\/a>\u00a0 See Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology<\/em>, pp. 128-29, 146; Psychology of Religion<\/em>, p. 123.\u00a0 I discuss this in my essay, \u201cThe Scope and Limits of Van Til\u2019s Transcendental Argument,\u201d pp. 43 ff, http:\/\/www.christianciv.com\/The_Scope_and_Limits_of_VTAG.pdf<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[8]<\/a>\u00a0 Van Til, The Defense of the Faith<\/em> (1955), p. 204.<\/p>\n

[9]<\/a>\u00a0 Ibid.<\/p>\n

[10]<\/a>\u00a0 Ibid., p. 211.<\/p>\n

[11]<\/a>\u00a0 Van TIl, Common Grace and the Gospel<\/em>, \u201cPreface,\u201d p. v.<\/p>\n

[12]<\/a>\u00a0 Ibid., pp. 201-02.<\/p>\n

[13]<\/a>\u00a0 Van Til, A Christian Theory of Knowledge<\/em>, pp. 37-38.<\/p>\n

[14]<\/a>\u00a0 Van Til, The Doctrine of Scripture<\/em>, pp. 122-23.<\/p>\n

[15]<\/a>\u00a0 Van TIl, Christian Apologetics<\/em>, p. 2.<\/p>\n

[16]<\/a>\u00a0 Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel<\/em>, pp. 9-10 (emphasis in original).<\/p>\n

[17]<\/a>\u00a0 \u201cThe Scope and Limits of Van Til\u2019s Transcendental Argument,\u201c \u201cIII. TAG as Natural Revelation,\u201d pp. 27ff., http:\/\/www.christianciv.com\/The_Scope_and_Limits_of_VTAG.pdf<\/p>\n

[18]<\/a>\u00a0 John Frame, Apologetics: A Justification of Christian Belief<\/em> (Phillipsburg, NJ:\u00a0 Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, 2015), p. 74.\u00a0 I comment on this in my essay, \u201cA (Very) Critical Review of Frame the Fuzzy Van Tillian\u2019s Book Apologetics<\/em>, http:\/\/www.christianciv.com\/Review_of_Frame’s_Apologetics.pdf<\/a>, p. 10.<\/p>\n

[19]<\/a>\u00a0 Van Til, Christianity in Conflict<\/em>, pp. 264-68.<\/p>\n

[20]<\/a>\u00a0 Ibid., p. 265.<\/p>\n

[21]<\/a>\u00a0 Ibid.<\/p>\n

[22]<\/a>\u00a0 Aquinas, Summa Theologica<\/em>, Part 1, 2.1.<\/p>\n

[23]<\/a>\u00a0 Ibid., Part 1, 2.2.<\/p>\n

[24]<\/a>\u00a0 Calvin, Institutes<\/em>, 2.2.13.<\/p>\n

[25]<\/a>\u00a0 Introduction to Systematic Theology<\/em>, p. 82.<\/p>\n

[26]<\/a>\u00a0 Ibid.<\/p>\n

[27]<\/a>\u00a0 Calvin, Institutes, 2.2.12.<\/p>\n

[28]<\/a>\u00a0 Ibid., 2.2.13.<\/p>\n

[29]<\/a>\u00a0 Introduction to Systematic Theology<\/em>, p. 82.<\/p>\n

[30]<\/a> Ibid., p. 83, emphasis in original.<\/p>\n

[31]<\/a>\u00a0 Ibid., p. 82.<\/p>\n

[32]<\/a>\u00a0 Ibid., p. 83.<\/p>\n

[33]<\/a>\u00a0 Van Til, Christian Apologetics<\/em>, p. 23.<\/p>\n

[34]<\/a>\u00a0 Ibid., p. 38.<\/p>\n

[35]<\/a>\u00a0 Greg L. Bahnsen, Van Til\u2019s Apologetic:\u00a0 Readings and Analysis<\/em> (Phillipsburg, NJ:\u00a0 P&R Publishing, 1998), p. 549 n. 64.<\/p>\n

[36]<\/a> Cornelius Van Til, The Protestant Doctrine of Scripture<\/em>\u00a0 (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1968), p. 103.<\/p>\n

[37]<\/a> \u00a0Van Til, The Defense of the Faith<\/em> (1955), pp. 126-27. \u00a0Cornelius Van Til, The Great Debate Today<\/em> (Nutley, NJ:\u00a0 Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1971), pp. 219-20.<\/p>\n

[38]<\/a>\u00a0 Martin Luther, On Secular Authority <\/em>(n.p. 1523), in Luther And Calvin On Secular Authority<\/em> (Harro H\u00f6pfl ed. & trans., Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 34-35.<\/p>\n

[39]<\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[40]<\/a>\u00a0 Ibid., p. 35.<\/p>\n

[41]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0 Kenneth C. Barnes, Nazism, Liberalism, & Christianity<\/em> (1991), p. 122.<\/p>\n

[42]<\/a>\u00a0 For a defense of Theonomy as consistent with the WCF, see Kenneth L. Gentry, Jr., \u201cTheonomic Ethics and the Westminster Confession,\u201d http:\/\/www.cmfnow.com\/articles\/pe551.htm<\/a>; and his Covenantal Theonomy: A Response to T. David Gordon and Klinean Covenantalism<\/em> (Nacogdoches, TX:\u00a0 Covenant Media Press, 2005).<\/p>\n

[43]<\/a>\u00a0 Greg L. Bahnsen, By This Standard: The Authority of God\u2019s Law Today<\/em> (Tyler, TX:\u00a0 Institute for Christian Economics, 1985), p. 327.\u00a0 Also, No Other Standard:\u00a0 Theonomy and Its Critics<\/em> (Tyler, TX:\u00a0 Institute for Christian Economics, 1991), p. 114, 121, 126, 127, 135, 155, 157, 175, 206, 222.<\/p>\n

[44]<\/a>\u00a0 Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology<\/em>, pp. 67-68; Christian Apologetics<\/em>, p. 66.<\/p>\n

[45]<\/a>\u00a0 Ibid., p. 133 (emphasis in original).<\/p>\n

[46]<\/a>\u00a0 Ibid., p.65.<\/p>\n

[47]<\/a>\u00a0 Quoting Frame\u2019s article \u201cTranscendental Arguments,\u201d https:\/\/frame-poythress.org\/transcendental-arguments\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[48]<\/a>\u00a0 Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology<\/em>, pp. 102, 104.<\/p>\n

[49]<\/a>\u00a0 Van Til, The Reformed Pastor and Modern Thought<\/em>, p. 115.<\/p>\n

[50]<\/a>\u00a0 Van Til, Christianity and Barthianism <\/em>(Phillipsburg, NJ, Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1962), p. 246.<\/p>\n

[51]<\/a>\u00a0 Van Til, Christianity and Barthianism<\/em>, p. 380.<\/p>\n

[52]<\/a>\u00a0 Van Til, Christian Apologetics<\/em>, pp. 87-88.<\/p>\n

[53]<\/a>\u00a0 Van Til, A Survey of Christian Epistemology<\/em>, p. 64.<\/p>\n

[54]<\/a>\u00a0 Willard Van Orman Quine,\u00a0\u201cTwo Dogmas of Empiricism,\u201d (1951, revised 1961), http:\/\/www.ditext.com\/quine\/quine.html<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[55]<\/a>\u00a0 Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel<\/em>, p. 3.<\/p>\n

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J.V. Fesko argues in his book, Reforming Apologetics, that Cornelius Van Til rejects natural revelation, and that Van Til rejects the arguments of Aquinas for the existence of God because Aquinas used ideas from Aristotle, which is a use of … Continue reading →<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[3],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/christianciv.com\/blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/426"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/christianciv.com\/blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/christianciv.com\/blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/christianciv.com\/blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/christianciv.com\/blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=426"}],"version-history":[{"count":6,"href":"https:\/\/christianciv.com\/blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/426\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":485,"href":"https:\/\/christianciv.com\/blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/426\/revisions\/485"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/christianciv.com\/blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=426"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/christianciv.com\/blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=426"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/christianciv.com\/blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=426"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}